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LET THE LANDLORD BEWARE:
CALIFORNIA IMPOSES STRICT
LIABILITY ON LESSORS OF
RENTAL HOUSING
Becker v. IRM Corp.'
The California Supreme Court's decision in Becker v. IRM Corp.2 has
ousted notice, one of the few remaining vestiges of the five century reign of
caveat emptor principles which once dominated real property leasing trans-
actions. Equating the landlord to a distributor who markets rental housing,
the court extended a cause of action in strict tort liability to the plaintiff
tenant whose personal injuries resulted from a latent defect in rental premises,
despite the landlord's inspection to discover such a defect upon purchasing
the building in a used condition.
In Becker, tenant plaintiff sustained a severely lacerated broken arm when
he slipped and fell against an untempered shower glass door in the apartment
rented from defendant IRM Corp., who acquired the 15 year old, 36 unit
apartment complex four years before plaintiff's accident occurred. A pre-
purchase inspection by defendant's officers revealed no visible differences in
the shower doors. Defendant knew of no prior accidents in the complex
involving shower doors. After the accident, defendant's maintenance man
inspected all shower doors in order to replace those containing untempered
glass. He stated that "[t]here was no way a layperson could tell any difference
by simply looking at the shower doors. The only way I was able to differ-
entiate ... was by looking for a very small mark in the corner of each piece
of glass." 3
Plaintiff's complaint asserted causes of action against the landlord IRM
Corp. in both negligence and strict tort liability." The Superior Court, Contra
1. 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 457-58, 698 P.2d at 118, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
4. The strict liability cause of action, as interpreted by the court, is an
outgrowth of RESTATEZMNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer or to his
property if:
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
1
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Costa County, entered summary judgment in favor of the landlord, accepting
his contention that absent concealment of a known danger or an express
statutory or contractual duty to repair, a landlord could not be held liable
when a tenant sustained injuries caused by a latent defect in the rented
premises. Plaintiff appealed.6 In a 5-2 decisionJ the California Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's granting of a summary judgment on both the
negligence and strict liability claims.8
The trial court's holding reflects the traditional view of landlord tort
immunity where a tenant's injuries are caused by a hidden defect unknown
to the landlord. 9 Other jurisdictions have rejected any rigid categories of
immunity in favor of a traditional negligence standard which requires the
landlord to exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an unreasonable
risk of harm."'
With the advent of the implied warranty of habitability for residential
dwellings," some courts have allowed recovery in contract for a tenant's
personal injuries. These courts have done so by defining them as conse-
quential damages of the landlord's breach of warranty 2 under the common
law rules first enunciated in Hadley v. Baxendale,3 or by analogy to U.C.C.
2-715(2)(b). 4 Any recovery under this theory, however, depends upon the
plaintiff proving that the landlord had notice of the defect. 5
The majority's rationale for extending strict liability began by tracing
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
5. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 457, 698 P.2d at 117, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
6. While the appeal was pending in the California Supreme Court, plaintiff
settled with the builder and a door assembler and installer for $150,000, plus an
additional $50,000 in the event the appeal proved unsuccessful. Id. at n.1.
7. Broussard, J., writing for the majority: Broussard, Kaus, Reynoso, and
Grodin, J.J. Bird, C.J., filed a separate concurring opinion. Lucas and Mosk, J.J.,
concurred as to the negligence reversal and dissented as to the strict liability reversal.
8. 38 Cal. 3d at 469, 698 P.2d at 126, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
9. Zimmerman v. Moore, 441 N.E.2d 690, 693-94 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). See
generally W. PAGE KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, DAVID OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 53 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON).
See also Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 463, 698 P.2d at 121, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 218 (listing
five common exceptions to landlord immunity).
10. See Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
11. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 921 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111
Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
12. George Washington Univ. v. Weintraub, 458 A.2d 43, 45 (D.C. App.
1983).
13. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
14. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (1978): "Consequential damages resulting from the
seller's breach include . . . injury to person or property proximately resulting from
any breach of warranty." See generally PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 9, 98.
15. See infra note 59.
[Vol. 51
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the parallel application of strict liability under a contractual warranty theory
in the contexts of commercial transactions and real estate law.
Strict warranty liability for the sale of goods, more recently the sale of
real estate containing mass produced houses marketed by a builder/developer,
and leases of personalty all grew out of the decision in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc. ' 6 to shift the burden of loss from the consumer to the
"overall producing and marketing enterprise." '7 Although manufacturers and
their distributors are most often the target for liability, lessors and bailors
of personal property have also been held strictly liable on an expanded anal-
ogy to the distributor's responsibility.' 8 Builders of mass produced tract homes
have been likened to a manufacturer and held liable under the same prin-
ciples. 9 Landlord-tenant law, by comparison, underwent a similar upheaval
of traditional thinking with the adoption of an implied warranty of habit-
ability for residential dwellings. 20 In California, intrusions into the landlord's
cloak of immunity from liability for personal injury resulting from a defective
condition of the premises included five well recognized exceptions: where the
landlord voluntarily undertakes repairs; where the landlord had knowledge
of defects; where a safety law was violated; where the landlord retained a




The court also outlined scattered cases holding a landlord in the rental
business strictly liable under express or implied warranty principles for in-
juries resulting from defective fixtures or furnishings on the premises. 22
The majority concluded from this analysis that the present duties of the
landlord, combined with the policy behind strict liability in tort, 23 "required"
16. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
17. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 459, 698 P.2d at 119, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216 (quoting
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 899 (1964)).
18. Id., 698 P.2d at 119, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216 (citing Price v. Shell Oil Co.,
2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970)).
19. Id. at 460, 698 P.2d at 119-20, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17 (citing Kriegler
v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969)); Avner v.
Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1969)).
20. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr.
704 (1974) (following reasoning of Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 921 (1970)).
21. Becker, Cal. 3d at 463, 698 P.2d at 121, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 218 (citing 3
WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAHiFolur LAW 2135-36 (8th ed. 1973)).
22. Id. at 463-64, 698 P.2d at 121-22, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 218-19.
23. The three most common justifications for adopting strict tort liability
include: (1) the costs resulting from damaging events due to defective products can
best be borne by the enterprisers who make and sell the products by distributing the
losses of the few among the many who purchase the products; (2) promotion of
accident prevention through safer design by eliminating the need to prove negligence;
and (3) although negligence may often be present with respect to defective products,
it may be difficult to prove and should no longer be required if product defect is
properly defined and limited. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 9, at 98.
1986]
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them to hold that "a landlord engaged in the business of leasing dwellings
is strictly liable in tort for injuries resulting from a latent defect in the
premises when the defect existed at the time the premises were let to the
tenant." 2 4 Such a landlord plays a substantial role in an enterprise; that the
enterprise involves real estate should no longer immunize him from liability. 25
Defendant argued that since he purchased an existing building, not new,
he should be exempted from strict liability because, like dealers in used
personalty, he had no continuing business relationship with the manufac-
turer/builder, therefore removing him from the manufacturing and marketing
enterprise which produced the defect. 26
The court, however, characterized the "enterprise" as one of marketing
rental housing, not as one of marketing housing or the components thereof.
It then concluded that a continuing business relationship 27 was not essential
to the paramount policy behind imposing strict liability: "the spreading
throughout society of the cost of compensating otherwise defenseless victims
of manufacturing defects." 28 In the majority's opinion, a manufacturer's
possible unavailability enhanced their justification for imposing liability on
"persons engaged in the enterprise who can spread the cost of compensa-
tion." 29
24. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219. The
court then justified their imposition of strict liability on virtually identical grounds
to those for adopting the implied warranty of habitability: tenant's inability to ad-
equately inspect; tenant's reliance on landlord's implied assurance of safety; landlord
in superior position to bear the risks and costs. Id. at 464-65, 698 P.2d at 122-23,
213 Cal. Rptr. at 219-20.
25. Id. at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
26. Id. at 465, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402(A) comment q (1965), distinguishes "a seller of a product expected to
be processed or otherwise substantially changed before it reaches the user or con-
sumer." No opinion is offered on whether such sellers should be held strictly liable.
Cases discussing the issue in the context of used rental housing have rejected liability
on an analogy to the dealer who sells used goods. See Kahf v. Charleston South
Apartments, 461 N.E.2d 723, 732-33 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Zimmerman v. Moore,
441 N.E. 2d 690, 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Henderson v. W.C. Haas Realty Man-
agement Co., 561 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
27. It is unclear from the opinion whether the court meant the relationship
with the previous owner of the housing or the relationship with various manufacturers
of products which comprise each dwelling unit. The latter seems the logical inference
from the text of the opinion.
28. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 466, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
29. Id. But cf. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 466, 698 P.2d at 124, 213 Cal. Rptr. at
221. The majority acknowledged that:
along with other numerous factors the price of used rental housing will
depend in part on the quality of the building and reflect the anticipated
costs of protecting tenants, including repairs, replacement of defects and
insurance. Further, the landlord after purchase may be able to adjust rents
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The court then distinguished between a seller of used goods (who merely
resells them without warranty or alteration of their demised condition) which
would otherwise be scrapped,30 and a landlord who has a "continuing re-
lationship to the property following renting, in contrast to the used machinery
dealer, who sells. ' 3' These factors, in addition to the notion that "the land-
lord will also often be able to seek equitable indemnity for losses," 32 led
the court to conclude that "[t]he cost of protecting tenants is an appropriate
cost of the enterprise. ' 33
Chief Justice Byrd's concurrence adopted the appellate court's majority
opinion,34 reemphasizing the characterization of the landlord as a "'retailer'
of rental housing ' 3s who would be able to redistribute the burden of loss to
the marketplace thus: "It is the defendant's participatory connection, for his
personal profit or other benefit, with the injury-producing product and with
the enterprise that created consumer demand and reliance upon the product
S.. which calls for imposition of strict liability." ' 36 Byrd also elaborated on
the flexibility of the California courts' definition of the "defect" in strict
products liability cases.37
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Lucas attacked on two bases the ma-
jority's "unprecedented leap" of allowing the strict liability claim. After
describing their logic as inconsistent with the policy established by prior
precedent, he argued that imposing such a broad burden on the landlord is
both unfair and impractical. 38
The dissent analyzed the development of strict products liability as fol-
lows. Historically, the courts based their rationale for strict tort liability upon
a manufacturer's ability to prevent the defect through careful design. 39 The
extension of liability to retailers4° grew logically from the philosophy that
retailers and distributors profited from their extensive participation in the
marketing enterprise and should therefore be required to share the burden
of losses caused by injuries from defective products which they made avail-
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Id. But cf. cases cited infra note 50 and accompanying text.
34. Becker v. IRM Corp., 144 Cal. App. 3d 321, 192 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1983),
rev'd, 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
35. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 476, 698 P.2d at 131, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 228 (Bird,
C.J., concurring).
36. Id. at 475, 698 P.2d at 130, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 227 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
37. Id. at 478-79, 698 P.2d at 132-33, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 229-30 (Bird, C.J., con-
curring); cf. infra note 66 and accompanying text.
38. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 479, 698 P.2d at 133, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 230 (Lucas,
J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 480-81, 698 P.2d at 133, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 230 (Lucas, J., dis-
senting).
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able through a continuous course of business." Furthermore, this extension
was fair in light of the continuing business relationship with the manufac-
turer, which gave the distributor an ability to bargain for indemnification
agreements to deflect the compensation burden.
4 2
In contrast, the landlord has no such continuing relationship. 43 Earlier
cases finding landlords strictly liable characterized their role as a lessor of
furniture or appliances which they purchased and placed in the dwellings,
not as a lessor of real property and its fixtures. 4 4 Justice Lucas argued that the
majority avoided this distinction by focusing on the wrong stream of com-
merce-the lessor's relationship to the property-rather than the lessor's
relationship to'those up the original chain of distribution. 45 A landlord own-
ing used property will not know the origin of many of its component parts
nor will he have the bargaining power necessary to defray the risk of lia-
bility.
46
That the premises contain a myriad of products, none of which the
landlord has necessarily selected or installed, further lessens his opportunity
to personally inspect and ensure the safety of each individual component. 47
Such a situation leaves the tenant with the reasonable expectation that a
landlord will repair or replace defective components when they become known
or discoverable48 The majority's emphasis on the risk-spreading function of
strict liability thus results in inherent problems and unfairness by failing to
take into account these practical considerations of extending liability. 49
In effect, the dissent merely echoes the concerns raised by other juris-
dictions rejecting a strict liability cause of action for injured tenants.5 0
41. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 480, 698 P.2d at 134, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 231 (citing
Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970)).
42. Id. at 480, 698 P.2d at 134, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 231 (Lucas, J., dissenting)
(citing Vandermark, 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 89).
43. Id. at 466, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220. It is this distinction,
the dissent argues, that makes IRM Corp. more like a dealer in used goods who should
not be held strictly liable. California courts have rejected strict liability for dealers
of used goods such as machinery. See Id. at 482, 698 P.2d at 135, 213 Cal. Rptr. at
232 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 481, 698 P.2d at 134, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 231 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 483-84, 698 P.2d at 136, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 233 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 485, 698 P.2d at 137, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 234 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
47. Id., 698 P.2d at 138, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 235 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 486, 698 P.2d at 138, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 235 (Lucas, J., dissenting)
(citing Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463 (Ct. App. Div.),
aff'd obiter dictum, 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973)).
49. Id. at 484-85, 698 P.2d at 137, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
50. See Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, 123 N.J. Super. 48, 53, 301 A.2d 463,
467 (Ct. App. Div.), aff'd, 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973); see also George Wash-
ington Univ. v. Weintraub, 458 A.2d 43 (D.C. App. 1983); Mondreau v. General Elec-
tric Co., 2 Haw. 10, 625 P.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1981); Dapunkas v. Cagle, 42 Ill.
6
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Unlike Becker, both Zimmerman and Boudreau involved "occasional"
landlords who could not be considered "in the business" of leasing.', One
court reasoned that liability based on the 402A theory was unnecessary be-
cause the privity between lessor and lessee affords the tenant greater protec-
tion than an ordinary consumer purchasing goods. 2 Other cases emphasize
that a tenant's recovery is contractually based. 3
In refusing to allow a cause of action for personal injuries based on the
implied warranty of habitability, the court in Dapkunas v. Cagle54 pointed
out:
At the time of the early product liability law developments away from privity
notions, purchasers of manufactured products did not have the benefit of
anything comparable to a building code to control manufacturers. It can
hardly be said, therefore, that a present-day tenant injured by a defect in
the leased premises is in the same remediless position with respect to the
landlord as the injured purchaser once was with respect to the product
manufacturer."
This statement illustrates various courts' concern with the strained 16 analogy
between a landlord and a retailer of commercial goods. Rental property,
although in a sense a "package of goods,"'5 7 is comprised of numerous
products which vary in age, quality and complexity. As to many of these
components, a landlord may have no greater expertise than the ordinary
consumer, especially when the landlord buys used housing. 8 Absent notice"
App. 3d 644, 357 N.E.2d 575 (1976); Zimmerman v. Moore, 441 N.E.2d 690 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1982); Henderson v. W.C. Haas Realty Management Co., 561 S.W.2d 382,
387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Curry v. New York City Housing Auth., 77 A.D.2d 534,
430 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1980) (overruled earlier case extending strict liability by analogy
to RiESTATEMENT (SEcoND) TORTS § 402(A) (1965)); Kaplan v. Coulston, 85 Misc. 2d
745, 381 N.Y.S.2d 634 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1976).
51. See supra note 26. The majority vaguely confines its extension of strict
liability to those "in the business of leasing dwellings." Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464,
698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
52. Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744, 768 (1976), dismissed
on other grounds, 267 Ind. 176, 369 N.E.2d 404 (1977).
53. See, e.g., Chubb Group of Ins. Co. v. C.F. Murphy & Assoc., 656 S.W.2d
766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
54. 42 Ill. App. 3d 644, 356 N.E.2d 575 (1976).
55. Id. at 652, 356 N.E.2d at 581.
56. Old Town, 349 N.E.2d at 768.
57. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 921 (1970); see generally Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises:
Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability? 1975 Wis. L. REv. 19, 130-60.
58. Zimmerman v. Moore, 441 N.E.2d 690, 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
59. Jurisdictions disagree on the proper application and effect of the notice
requirement in negligence and warranty claims. In order to recover under either
theory, all other jurisdictions (except Louisiana, see discussion infra notes 78-80 and
accompanying text) require the landlord to have actual or constructive notice of a
7
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from the tenant who has control and possession, 60 the landlord has little
opportunity to discover latent defects through continuous inspection and
preventative maintenance. Finally, "[a]lthough a landlord may well be in a
better economic position to bear the risk than is his tenant, [unlike the
builder-vendor] he may not be in the position of creating the defect. ' 6'
In her concurring opinion, Chief Justice Bird elaborates on the concept
of "defect" used by the California courts in products liability actions. Barker
v. Lull Engineering Co. 62 set forth the standards for establishing a "defect"
thus:
defect before incurring liability. See, e.g., George Washington Univ. v. Weintraub,
458 A.2d 43 (D.C. App. 1983); Henderson v. W.C. Haas Realty Management Co.,
561 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). Jurisdictions differ as to whether liability
should be imposed from the date of notice, Berman v. Watergate West, Inc., 391
A.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1978), or from the date upon which a landlord has had a
reasonable time to repair and fails to do so, Mahlmann v. Yelverton, 109 Misc. 2d
127, 439 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980). Courts acknowledge that "this notice
requirement would seem to reduce the concept of implied warranty of habitability to
one of negligence . . . ." Henderson, 561 S.W.2d at 387. "Liability for negligence
and breach of warranty turn out to be virtually the same: the former for failure to
use reasonable care to cure a known (or constructively known) defect, and the latter
for breach of a covenant not to permit a known (or constructively known) defect."
Weintraub, 458 A.2d at 52 (Ferren, J., dissenting).
60. Browder, The Taming of a Duty-The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81
MicH. L. REv. 137-38 (1982). Browder states that notice is the central theme of
landlord tenant law because, unlike sales transactions, the tenant is in possession and
control, but not complete ownership of the premises, while the landlord will remain
liable for the defects:
It does make a difference if you are in control, if for no other reason than
that you are the one who will know what is wrong. If you know it, can you
hide it or forget about it? If your being in possession, or at least in constant
contact, is no longer the basis for putting all the risks on you, you may well
remain under a duty to communicate what you see. It is the kind of com-
munication that tenants have never been reluctant to make; they do it all
the time, even under the old law. The only alternative is to prescribe a right
in a landlord to inspect leased premises regularly. Apart from the invasion
of privacy this entails, inspection from time to time is not an effective
substitute for the knowledge of a defect by the person who lives there. The
ultimate goal of the new regime in landlord-tenant law is to keep premises
in a habitable condition. Can a tenant who sees a defect, perhaps small but
possibly dangerous, in a floor, a balcony, or in plumbing or heating equip-
ment, be permitted to keep it to himself and later claim damages, perhaps
staggering damages, for hospitalization or doctors' bills, if he is hurt by it,
or for wrongful death if his child is killed by it? And where, if the defect
were made known, it could have been repaired at a relatively insignificant
cost to the landlord?
Id. at 136-37; see also Kahf v. Charleston South Apartments, 461 N.E.2d 723, 731
(Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
61. Kahf, 461 N.E.2d at 733.
62. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
8
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First, a product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff establishes
that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would
expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. [The
Consumer Expectations test] Second, a product may alternatively be found
defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design
proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to establish, in light
of the relevant factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design
outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design. [The Risk-Utility test] -'
Although Justice Bird proceeds to enumerate the factors to be considered by
a jury in evaluating the product's design,6 neither she nor the majority
attempt to explain how the concept of a design defect relates to a dwelling
unit. Is the dwelling unit defective in design because it contains a defective
product, or is the plaintiff merely expected to present the same case against
the landlord as he would against the manufacturer? In either situation, prac-
ticality concerns abound.
If the dwelling unit is the "defective product," the tenant will be unable
to rely on the landlord's knowledge regarding the design of each individual
component of the dwelling. Rather, the landlord will evaluate the dwelling
unit as one "product" when taking into account the benefits of the design
versus risk of the danger. Under the risk-utility test, the plaintiff will en-
counter problems in meeting the landlord's defense that the benefits of the
overall design of the dwelling outweigh the danger imposed by a single de-
fective component.
If the plaintiff attempts to show that the dwelling unit violates consumer
expectations, he encounters another curious situation. The landlord, his agent,
or perhaps even a city building inspector (or any combination thereof) may
have thoroughly examined the dwelling unit prior to occupancy and con-
cluded that it meets their safety expectations (as both a consumer and a
quasi-expert). In this situation, how does a jury reconcile these differences
to determine the correct "expectations of a hypothetical reasonable con-
sumer, rather than those of the particular plaintiff in the case[?]" 6 Will the
plaintiff's expectations be allowed any benefit of the hindsight produced by
his injury? At least one author has suggested that the injection of this rea-
sonableness concept into California's strict liability formula defeats the enun-
ciated purpose of simplifying a plaintiff's recovery (despite the shifting of
the burden of proof under the risk-utility test) and lulls an unwary plaintiff
into a false sense of virtually certain recovery.
66
63. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr at 237-38.
64. Becker, 3& Cal. 3d at 470, 698 P.2d at 132, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 229 (Bird,
C. J., concurring).
65. Use of the "hypothetical reasonable consumer" appears to be required
by Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 126 n.6, 649 P.2d 224, 233
n.6, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 900 n.6 (1982) (en banc).
66. Wildman & Farrell, Strict Products Liability in California: An Ideological
Overview, 19 U.S.F. L. REv. 153 (1985).
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If, on the other hand, the plaintiff need only make out the same case
against the landlord as he would against the manufacturer, policy questions,
in addition to those raised by the dissent 67 will undoubtedly arise. For ex-
ample, will a defendant landlord, faced with an unavailable manufacturer-
a situation which the majority concludes is a proper reason for extending
liability6 8-be expected to defend the technical advantages of a product with-
out access to information or experts describing the origin and formulation
of a particular design? Must the landlord defend the product to defend
himself' If not, how does he defend himself? 6 9
Unlike a merchant whose volume of sales and resulting profit depends
in a large part upon the goodwill generated by quality sales and service, a
landlord has a limited number of units, usually offered at a fixed yearly
rental rate. A landlord will not necessarily derive any greater profit by pro-
viding the safest available components for his dwelling, and his liability will
ultimately depend upon the skill of the component's manufacturer, not the
landlord's skill in choosing the best component. The landlord's profit de-
pends on the supply and demand for the type of housing he offers, not on
the availability of safer alternatives to a dwelling's component parts. The
landlord is thus placed in the position of having to bear the burden of the
manufacturer's risk, without expectation of receiving the attendant benefit. 70
These concerns illustrate the problem with adopting strict liability for land-
lords based on an analogy to a theory designed to justify products liability
claims.
Professor Browder7' predicted that such an analogy could merely divert
attention from the main issue,7 2 which he summarized thus: Does current
public policy, inhering in landlord tenant relations, compel or justify holding
landlords in all cases as insurers of the condition of leased premises? 73
Browder suggests that such a policy would be most palatable in the
limited circumstance where a tenant is injured by a defect in leased premises
67. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
69. Justice Lucas' dissent observes that the result of Becker's holding "amounts,
in effect, to insurance for tenants, because it does nothing to aid in the goals of
deterrence or products safety." Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 487, 698 P.2d at 139, 213 Cal.
Rptr. at 236 (Lucas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see also infra note 77.
70. Justice Lucas' dissent concludes:
Even if landlords can sue participants in the original line of manufacturing
and marketing, the litigation costs involved will likely also have an effect
on the price of rental housing. Arguably, instead of risk distribution, the
majority's conclusion will result in a general increased cost attributable to
the risks involved without a concurrent benefit. Someone will have to pay
for the additional litigation today's decision is likely to create.
Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 487 n.6, 698 P.2d at 138 n.6, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 236 n.6.
71. Browder, supra note 60.
72. Id. at 136.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
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which is unknown to him [the tenant] and to the landlord and which could
not have been reasonably discovered by either.7 4 In that case, the notice
requirement serves no function,75 except to insulate the landlord' from lia-
bility,76 and the question becomes: who must bear the loss? One common
modern response to this question is that the loss can be spread either through
a public entitlement program or private insurance plan purchased by the
tenant or landlord. 77 Louisiana approaches the problem of loss spreading by
holding the landlord strictly liable for all defects in the premises "provided
they do not arise from the fault of the lessee."8 Thus, the landlord's "strict"
liability is tempered by defenses of voluntary assumption of the risk and
contributory negligence.7 9 Landlords typically insure themselves against lia-
bility for unanticipated injurious defects,8 0 and presumably pass at least some
of this cost to their tenants, although the effect on rental rates' has been
debated.8'
Becker represents an ideological leap in the field of landlord liability-
a leap over (or around) notice of a defect. Not only does the decision leave
practicality concerns unanswered, the theory used by the court focuses un-
necessarily on an analogy designed to equate compensation with protection.
In doing so, the court blurs its justification of its stated goal: shifting tenants'
unanticipated financial burdens by redistribution of costs. The court reduces
its credibility by failing to confront the policy issue in the context of real
property law, where both of the contractors-landlord and tenant-are con-
sumers, and never answers the question implicit in extending liability: Why
should the landlord subsidize the manufacturer's responsibility to pay for
manufacturing mistakes?
JE-N L. EARLY
74. Id. at 137-38.
75. Id. at 138 ("The basic policy of forcing improvements in deteriorated or
defective housing is not relevant if no one knows of the particular defect.").
76. Id.
77. Id. at 138-39. Browder notes, however, that "courts have traditionally
avoided framing rules of tort law on the basis of the availability of insurance to one
or both of the parties in a legal relationship."
78. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (West 1973).
79. Frey v. Galle, 399 So. 2d 1300, 1301-02 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
80. See, e.g., Andersen v. Sciambra, 310 So. 2d 128 (La. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 313 So. 2d 835 (1975).
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